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WILLS-EXECUTION-The Pennyslvania. Supreme Court has
held that a signature by a decedent on the portion of a printed
will form that is normally used to identify the document when
properly folded does not satisfy the statutory requirement that a
will be signed at the end thereof.
In re Estate of Proley, 492 Pa. 57, 422 A.2d 136 (1980).
Susanna H. Proley employed a printed will form, in the blank
spaces of which in her own handwriting, she made gifts of her
estate, named an executor, and gave burial instructions.' She left
most of her estate to one of her nieces, Florence R. Bye, and
made a small bequest to her executor.2 Then she specifically
named her other nine nieces and nephews and made bequests of
$1.00 to each of them.' The will form was printed on one sheet of
paper approximately 28 inches long, which was folded once hori-
zontally at mid-point and was utilized in a manner similar to a
stenographer's notebook.' Miss Proley wrote her name in the
first paragraph of the form and again on the back part of the
sheet in the portion that is normally used for identifying the doc-
ument when it is properly folded. This second signature ap-
peared beneath the words "WILL OF," with her address and the
date of the will, at right angles to the rest of the writing in the
document." She did not complete the attestation clause, but di-
rected two witnesses to sign their names to the right of it, next
to a red seal.' She then told them that the document was her
will, but she did not sign it in their presence
Susanna Proley died on April 14, 1977, survived by her nieces
and nephews as heirs at law.' The will was offered for probate
1. Proley Will, 30 Pa. Fiduc. 74 (1980). The will was dated June 4, 1972.
2. Id. at 75.
3. Id.
4. In re Estate of Proley, 492 Pa. 57, 67, 422 A.2d 136, 141 (1980)(per
curiam).
5. 30 Pa. Fiduc. at 75. Only Susanna Proley's name and the date appeared
on this page; all testamentary dispositions ended on the third page of the will.
Id
6. 492 Pa. at 67, 422 A.2d at 141.
7. Id. at 64-65, 422 A.2d at 139-40.
8. Id. at 65, 422 A.2d at 140.
9. 30 Pa. Fiduc. at 74.
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on June 10, 1977,10 and after a hearing was admitted to probate
by the Register of Wills of Philadelphia County, who determined
that it was signed at the end as required by statute." One of the
intestate heirs appealed this determination. to the Orphans'
Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia
County."2 The auditing judge for the orphans' court reversed the
decree of the Register of Wills and. denied admission of the will
to probate because he found that the decedent had not complied
with the statutory formalities. s Florence.Bye, proponent of the
will, filed exceptions to the auditing judge's decision. These were
dismissed by the orphans' court sitting en banc, and Ms. Bye ap-
pealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.1"
In a 3-3 decision, the supreme court determined that the will
was invalid because it was not signed at the end thereof."5 Writ-
ing in support of the affirmance of the lower court, Justice
Roberts"6 asserted that Pennsylvania case law had established
that a decedent's intent or belief was irrelevant to the determin-
ation of whether his signature appeared at the end of his will. 7
10. Id.
11. " 492 Pa. at'65, 422 A.2d at 140. The relevant portion of the statute pro-
vides: "Every will shall be in writing and shall be signed by the testator at the
end thereof .... " 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502 (Purdon 1980). The proper title of
the statute is DECEDENTS, ESTATES AND FIDUCIARIES, but it is frequently re-
ferred to as the Wills Act, the title of the preceding statutes.
12. 30 Pa. Fiduc. at 74.
13. Id. The auditing judge was convinced that the decedent signed the
document intending it to be her will and that she had substantially complied
with the required testamentary formalities. But he determined that she had
signed in the wrong place and that he was bound by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's decisions that held that these formalities must be strictly construed. He
suggested that if the doctrine of substantial compliance were available, the
courts would often be able to give effect to a decedent's intent and avoid unfair
results. He did not define the docrine but indicated that Under the doctrine,
proponents of a will would be allowed to prove that a formal defect amounted
to harmless error. Id. at 77. See infra text accompanying notes 97-104.
14. 492 Pa. at 60, 422 A.2d at 137. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over appeals from final decrees of the orphans' court division of a
court of common pleas. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 722 (Purdon 1980).
15. 492 Pa. at 60, 422 A.2d at 137. An evenly divided supreme court
automatically affirms the court below. See Sopin v. Luckacher, 394 Pa. 613, 148
A.2d 651 (1959).
16. Chief Justice O'Brien and Justice Larsen joined in this opinion.
17. 492 Pa. at 60, 422 A.2d at 137. See Bryen's Estate, 328 Pa. 122, 195 A.
17 (1937). In Bryen the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated a will con-
sisting of three attached unsigned pages accompanied by an earlier version of
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Further, he rejected what he termed the "flawed assertion"
made by some members of the court that the decedent complied
with the statutory requirement by signing the will at its literal
end."8 Justice Roberts cited Pennsylvania Supreme Court opin-
ions holding that the end of a will is not the point physically
most remote from the beginning, but rather that it is the sequen-
tial or logical end of the language used by the decedent in ex-
pressing his testamentary purpose." He maintained that the loca-
tion of Susanna Proley's signature was unrelated to the sub-
stance of the rest of the writing, and therefore, was not at the
sequential or logical end of her testamentary language."0
" Justice Roberts reasoned that Dietterich's Estate,2 involving a
similar printed will form which was filled in at the decedent's di-
rection by another person, was controlling.' The decedent in
that case later signed the form in the endorsement section on the
back, beneath the words "WILL OF."23 The Dietterich court held
that the will was not signed at the end because the place se-
lected by the decedent for her signature bore no relation to the
the third page which the testator had signed erroneously. The Bryen court
asserted that the question is not what a testator mistakenly thinks he is doing,
but what he actually does. Id. at 128, 195 A. at 20. Justice Roberts regarded the
effort by some members of the Proley court to effect what they perceived to be
the decedent's intent as misguided. 492 Pa. at 60, 422 A.2d at 137. See infra
text accompanying notes 32-38.
18. 492 Pa. at 60-61, 422 A.2d at 137-38. Justice Roberts disputed that the
signature was at the literal end. He rejected the characterization of the title
page as "page four" of the will and noted that the document bore no page
numbers. He also observed that the words on that page stood alone at right
angles to the rest of the writing. Id.'
19. Id. at 61, 422 A.2d at 138. See Kretz Estate, 410 Pa. 590, 189 A.2d 239
(1963). The Kretz court held that the decedent's signature on an envelope con-
taining a five-page holographic will was not at the end of the will as required by
statute. Writing for the majority in that case, Justice Roberts said that the
signature must be at the logical end of the language expressing testamentary
purpose, id. at 595, 139 A.2d at 242 (citing Kehr Will, 373 Pa. 473, 95 A.2d 647
(1953)), or that there must be a sequence of pages or paragraphs related to the
logical or internal sense of the will, with the signature placed at the sequential
end. 410 Pa. at 595; 189 A.2d at 242 (citing Coyne Will, 349 Pa.'331, 37 A.2d 509
(1944)).
20. 492 Pa. at 61, 422 A.2d at 138.
21. 127 Pa. Super. 315, 193 A. 158 (1937).
22. 492 Pa. at 62, 422 A.2d at 138.
23. 127 Pa. Super. at 317, 193 A. at 159. The decedent actually signed her
name on the back in the presence of two witnesses and directed them to sign
their names beneath hers. Id.
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nature of the will or its contents.4 Justice Roberts rejected the
contention that the Dietterich will could be distinguished from
the will of Susanna Proley on the ground that the former con-
tained a line for the testatrix' signature whereas the latter gave
no indication of a place to sign.25 In his view, the Proley will form
contained an obvious area for signing." He then noted that
where the decedent may have thought she should sign was ir-
relevant. The sole issue, Justice Roberts asserted, was whether
she signed at what objectively appeared as the logical or sequen-
tial end of her testamentary language.'
Lastly, Justice Roberts stated that the frustration of the dece-
dent's apparent testamentary intent may seem harsh, but that
this result is required by the legislature and may not be altered
by the court. 8 He maintained that the legislature had determined
that the risk of occasionally frustrating testamentary intent was
preferable to the risk of giving effect to or facilitating the forma-
tion of spurious wills. 9 Justice Roberts asserted that the purpose
of this section of the statute was to remove all possibility of
24. Id. at 323, 193 A. at 161.
25. 492 Pa. at 62, 422 A.2d at 138. See infra text accompanying notes 35-37.
The Dietterich court emphasized.that the will contained a line with a seal im-
mediately following the testamonium clause which clearly indicated where the
testator should sign. 127 Pa. Super. at 323, 193 A. at 161.
26. 492 Pa. at 62, 422 A.2d at 138. Justice Roberts viewed the bottom of
the final interior page of the will form, beneath the words "In Witness
Whereof, I have hereunto subscribed my name and affixed my seal .... as the
obvious area for signing. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. The very people whom Susanna Prosely expressly excluded from
any substantial bequest, her intestate heirs, will receive her estate Id. at 66,
422 at 141 (Opinion of Flaherty, J.) (quoting 30 Pa. Fiduc. at 77).
29. 492 Pa. at 62-63, 422 A.2d at 138. See Churchill's Estate, 260 Pa. 94, 103
A. 533 (1918), where the court determined that the decedent was merely acting
as his own scrivener in inserting his name in the testamonium and attestation
clauses of a printed will form and that the will failed because it was not signed
at the end thereof as required by statute. Id. at 100-01, 103 A. at 534-34. After
noting that the decedent's actions and not his intentions are crucial to the ques-
tion of whether he has made a valid will, the Churchill court asserted that this
was a matter of legislative determination. "The courts must consider that the
legislature, having regard to all probable circumstances, has thought it best,
and has therefore determined, to run the risk of frustrating the intention
sometimes, in preference to the risk of giving effect to or facilitating the forma-
tion of spurious wills." Id. at 101, 103 A. at 535. (quoting Smee v. Bryer, 6
Moore P.C. 404 (1848)). See infra text accompanying notes 92 & 93.
[Vol. 20:365
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fraud, particularly fraudulent or unauthorized alterations or ad-
ditions to wills. 30
Writing in support of reversal, Justice Flaherty3' noted the
lower court's reluctance to sustain the appeal which invalidated
the will, in light of its findings of clear testamentary intent and
the apparent necessity for frustrating that intent through the
strict application of legal formalities.2 Further, he contended
that the case demonstrated the inadequacy of what he termed
the "strict compliance rule." Justice Flaherty stated that he
reached a different result than did the orphans' court when he
applied the rule to determine whether the Proley will was signed
at the end. He asserted that where reasonable minds could thus
disagree, the rule itself presented obvious difficulties of applica-
tion .
Justice Flaherty provided a detailed analysis of the physical
features of the document.' He observed that while the form pro-
vided separate lines for the name(s) of the executor(s) and the
date of the will and a separate area for the signatures of witnes-
ses, there was no separate line or area for the signature of the
testatrix at the bottom of page three.35 Because language near
the bottom of that page indicated that the testatrix' signature
was subscribed, Justice Flaherty reasoned that she evidently
turned to page four looking for a continuation of the printed for-
mat and found what seemed to her to be the place for her
30. 492 Pa. at 63, 422 A.2d at 138-39 (quoting Coyne Will, 349 Pa. 331, 37
A.2d 509 (1944)), where the court rejected a one-page holographic will in which
the signature appeared above the testamentary disposition. The Coyne court
held that it was not signed at the end as required by the statute and cited
Brown Estate, 347 Pa. 244, 246 32 A.2d 22, 23 (1944), infra note 51, when it
asserted that the purpose of the legislative mandate was the elimination of all
possibility of fraud. 349 Pa. at 333-34, 37 A.2d at 511. (emphasis in original).
31. Justice Nix and Justice Kaufmann joined in this opinion.
32. 492 Pa. at 65-66, 422 A.2d at 140.
33. Id. at 66, 422 A.2d at 140.
34. Id. at 66-67, 422 A.2d at 140-41. Comparing the printed form to a
stenographer's notebook containing two pages, Justice Flaherty noted that one
who used it would begin writing on the first sheet, then would turn the page
and continue on page two, which would correspond to the bottom of page one.
In this view, page three would begin below the single horizontal fold at mid-
point; upon reaching the bottom of that page, the user would then turn to page
four, the top of which corresponded to the bottom of page three. Id. at 67, 422
A.2d at 141.
35. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 25 & 26.
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signature where special lines were provided beneath the words
"WILL OF. ' 3' He contended that the signature was at the end of
the will in that it was the last and only item on page four. 7 He
also viewed it as standing at what would have been for the dece-
dent the logical and sequential end, which is the end contem-
plated by the statute. 8
Justice Flaherty distinguished Dietterich's Estate9 because
the Dietterich printed form contained a clearly marked line for
the testatrix' signature and the Proley form provided no such in-
dication except for the lines on the back of the will."0 He conclud-
ed that in light of the design of the form employed by Miss Pro-
ley, she reasonably turned to that page in search of the place to
sign and then signed the will literally at the end."
Because the right to dispose of property by will is neither a
constitutional nor a common law one but is created by statute, a
valid disposition.mustconform to the formal requirements which
the state has established. 2 The first requirements were set forth
in 1677 in the English Statute of Frauds,'3 which prescribed that
a. will be written, signed by the testator, and witnessed." The
statute was silent about the location of the signature, and a sig-
nature appearing anywhere on the writing was held to be suffi-
cient.' The provision that the signature be located at the end or
foot of the will was added to English law by the Wills Act of
1837."
While virtually every state has a statute resembling the orig-
inal- English statute in important respects, only eight, including
Pennsylvania, require that a will be signed at the end thereof.47
36. 492 Pa. at 67, 422 A.2d at 141.
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing In re Estate of Stasis, 452 Pa. 425, 430, 307 A.2d 241, 244
(1973)). See infra note 74.
39. 127 Pa. Super. 315, 193 A. 158 (1937). See supra note 21.
40. 492 Pa. at 68, 422 A.2d at 141. See supra text accompanying notes
21-26.
41. 492 Pa. at 63, 422 A.2d at 141.
42. Maginn's Estate, 278 Pa. 89, 98, 122 A. 264, 267 (1923).
43. Statute of Frauds, 1676, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3, § 5.
44. Id.
45. Lemayne v. Stanley, 83 Eng. Rep. 545 (C.P. 1682).
46. Wills Act, 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. ch. 26 § 9 (mandated that a will be
signed "at the foot or end thereof.").
47. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 50 (1) (West 1956); FLA. STAT. § 732.502(1)
(1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-606 (1976); NEW YORK EST. POWERS & TRUSTS
LAW § 3.2.1(a)(1) (McKinney 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.03 (Page 1976);
[Vol. 20:365
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The specification was part of the Pennsylvania Wills Act of
18338 and has been retained in all subsequent enactments. 9 The
legislature included the provision to make wills conform to other
instruments for the transmission of title in their mode of execu-
tion, to provide a more certain and satisfactory means of authen-
tication, and to distinguish incomplete memoranda from full and
final testamentary declarations. ° The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has emphasized the requirement's function in preventing
unauthorized or fraudulent alterations or additions.'
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 551(1) (West 1970); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 29-2-6(1) (1976). During the past decade four states which previously had the
requirement-Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 15-2-502 (1979), Montana, MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 91A-2-502 (1977) North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-02 (1976) and Utah,
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-205 (1978),-have abolished it. All four states have
adopted the Uniform Probate Code, which does not specify a location for a
testator's signature. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-502, 8 U.L.A. 348-49
(1972).
48. The Wills Act of 1833, 1833 Pa. Laws 249 (repealed 1917). The statute
provided in pertinent part "[tihat every will shall be in writing, and unless the
person making the same shall be prevented by the extremity of his last
sickness, shall be signed by him at the end thereof .. " Id.
49. See The Wills Act of 1917, 1917 Pa. Laws 403 (codified at 20 PA. STAT.
ANN. § 191 (Purdon 1930)) (repealed 1947); Act of April 24, 1947, 1947 Pa. Laws
89 (codified at 20 PA. STAT. ANN. § 180.2 (Purdon 1950)). Act of July 1, 1972,
1972 Pa. Laws 508 (codified at 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502 (Purdon 1980)).
50. See Baker's Appeal, 107 Pa. 381, 388, (1884) (extensive analysis of the
purposes underlying the statute). The Baker court concluded that the objects of
the statute were abundantly shown both in the Report of the Commissioners
(Parke and Johnson 874) and in court decisions since its passage: Hays v.
Harden, 6 Pa. 409 (1847), and Stricker v. Groves, 5 Whart. 386 (Pa. 1839). In
Hays an addition after the signature was held to be testamentary and therefore
to invalidate the will under the statutory provisions. The Hays court noted that
the original English wills statute, 32 & 34 Hen. 8 P., required that a will of land
be in writing; the Act of 1705, 1 Sm. L. No. 33, required that it be proved by
the oaths or affirmations of two witnesses, 6 Pa. at 411-12; and the Act of 1833
added the requirement that a will be signed at the end by the testator, in order
that it should appear from the face of the instrument itself that the testator's
intent was consummated and the instrument was complete. 6 Pa. at 413. In
Stricker the court invalidated a will prepared at the direction of the decedent's
wife and never signed by him. The Stricker court asserted that the manifest in-
tention of the legislature in requiring that a will be signed at the end was to
provide a remedy for the mischiefs which arose from admitting papers to pro-
bate which were incomplete in form. 5 Whart. at 396.
See also Heise v. Heise, 31 Pa. 246 (1858), in which the court observed that
prior to the adoption of the requirement, unfinished papers and tentative ex-
pressions of testamentary purpose were frequently admitted to probate and
allowed to determine the distribution of property, producing results which the
decedent may never have intended. Id. at 248-49.
51. See Coyne Will, 349 Pa. 331, 37 A.2d 509 (1944), supra note 30; Brown
19821
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In the nineteenth century, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
declared that the words of the legislature regarding the provi-
sion were plain beyond the need of any judicial construction. 2
However, the courts frequently have had difficulty applying the
statutory language. As a result, "end" has been clarified to mean
the logical or sequential end of the testamentary language used
by the decedent.53 Even with this clarification, the determination
of whether a will is signed at the end has not been easy, as the
division of the Proley court itself indicates.
Moreover, whether a will is signed at all is a question of fact
and depends on whether or not the purported signature was
made by the testator with the intent that it be his signature.54
Whether a will is signed at the end, however, is solely a question
of law.5  Evidence of acts, declarations, and relevant cir-
Estate, 347 Pa. 214, 32 A.2d 22 (1943); Bryen's Estate, 328 Pa. 122, 195 A. 17
(1937), supra note 17. In Brown, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in rejecting a
purported will which was a signed application for a share account in a savings
and loan association on which testamentary directions were typed to the right
of the signature, held that testamentary intent was irrelevant and the purpose
of the Act was to remove all possibility of fraud. 347 Pa. at 246, 32 A.2d at 23.
The Bryen court asserted the importance of upholding the legal requirements
for the execution of wills so that the possibility of fraud might be reduced to a
minimum. 328 Pa. at 128, 195 A. at 20. See supra note 17.
52. Wineland's Appeal, 118 Pa. 37, 41, 12 A. 301, 302 (1888) ("[The statute]
says a will must be signed at the end thereof, and that's the end of it.").
53. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. Most jurisdictions make a
similar determination of "end." See, e.g., Estate of Seaman, 146 Cal. 455, 80 P.
700 (1905) (end of a will is the logical end of the disposition of property,
wherever that may appear in the instrument); Matter of Field, 204 N.Y. 448, 97
N.E. 881 (1912) (end of a will is the logical end where the draftsman has stopped
writing in the consecutive order of composition).
54. Preston Will, 18 Pa. Fiduc. 250 (1968). In Preston the court upheld a
will which the decedent signed in the portion of a printed will form meant for
the appointment of an executor. The court carefully distinguished the questions
of whether a writing was intended as a signature and whether the signature ap-
peared at the end of the will. Id. at 252-53.
55. Griffith Will, 358 Pa. 474, 57 A.2d 893 (1948). In Griffith a disputed co-
dicil appointing executors and trustees of the decedent's will was signed at the
conclusion of the testamentary directions, which were followed by unsigned tes-
tamonium and attestation clauses. In concluding that the codicil was properly
executed, the court said that whether a will is signed at the end is a question of
law, id. at 482-83, 57 A.2d at 897, which the Register of Wills had improperly
certified as a question of fact. Id. at 477, 5 A.2d at 875, See Coyne Will, 349 Pa.
331, 37 A.2d 509 (1944); Preston Will, 18 Pa. Fiduc. 250 (1968). But see Bradley
v. Bradley, 371 So. 2d 168 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). In Bradley a will was signed
in the endorsement section, presenting a problem nearly identical to that raised
by the Proley will. The Florida District Court of Appeals denied that the deter-
372 [Vol. 20:365
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cumstances is admissible to eliminate ambiguity and to prove a
testator's intention to sign,56 but such evidence is not admissible
to determine whether the signature appears at the end of the
will; instead, that must be determined by examining the face of
the instrument itself. 7 Because this determination often requires
a close factual scrutiny of the purported will, the separate ques-
tions of whether the will is signed and whether the signature ap-
pears at the end frequently become entangled. 8
As Justice Roberts noted in his opinion, the Pennsylvania
courts have repeatedly held that a decedent's intent or belief is
irrelevant to the determination of whether he has signed his will
at the end.59 Likewise, he identified a strong line of decisions
mination of whether the will was signed at the end was a matter of law and
ordered a formal hearing for each side to have the opportunity to call and cross-
examine witnesses. Evidence of the manner of execution and whether the name
was written with testamentary intent was regarded as relevant to the deter-
mination. The court acknowledged that only Florida allowed consideration of
evidence beyond the face of the document in answering the question of whether
a will was signed at the end. Id. at 171.
In other states the approach is similar to that of Pennsylvania. See Estate of
Seaman, 146 Cal. 455, 80 P. 700 (1905); Matter of Young, 36 Misc. 2d 718, 233
N.Y.S.2d 922 (1962); Sears v. Sears, 77 Ohio St. 104, 82 N.E. 1067 (1907).
56. Kehr Will, 373 Pa. 473, 476, 95 A.2d 647, 649 (1953). See infra notes 68
& 69 and accompanying text.
57. See Coyne Will, 349 Pa. 331, 37 A.2d 509 (1944), supra note 30; Brown
Estate, 347 Pa. 244, 32 A.2d 22 (1943), supra note 51. Responsibility for this
determination rests initially with the Register of Wills of each county and
subsequently with the appropriate courts of appeal. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. §§
901-25 (Purdon 1980); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 702-94 (Purdon 1980). See Walsh &
Jones, Instruments Signed "At The End Thereof' and the Register of Wills, 71
DICK. L. REV. 563 (1967).
58. See Churchill's Estate, 260 Pa. 94, 103 A. 533 (1918), supra note 29. In
Churchill the decedent used a printed will form and wrote his name at the be-
ginning in the recital, in the testamonium clause, and in the attestation clause.
The court held that the writing was not a will because it was not signed at the
end, id at 100-01, 103 A. at 535; however, it appears that the actual holding was
that the document was not signed at all, for the court determined that the dece-
dent was merely acting as his own scrivener when he inserted his name in the
three blank spaces of the will form. Id.
See Preston Will, 18 Pa. Fiduc. 250 (1968), supra note 511 (analysis of
Churchill and related decisions). A similar interpretation is found in P. BREGY,
PA. INTESTATE, WILLS, AND ESTATES ACT OF 1947 § 2502 (1949).
59. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. See also Glace Will, 413 Pa.
91, 196 A.2d 297 (1964); Kretz Estate, 410 Pa. 590, 189 A.2d 239 (1963), supra
note 19; Coyne Will, 349 Pa. 31, 37 A.2d 509 (1944), supra note 30; Brown
Estate, 347 Pa. 244, 32 A.2d 22 (1943), supra note 51; Churchill's Estate, 260 Pa.
94, 103 A. 533 (1918), supra notes 29 & 58. In Glace Will, the court rejected a
writing in which the decedent had inserted his name in the portion of the
19821
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which asserts the necessity of strictly enforcing this testamen-
tary formality as a matter of legislative mandate."0 Closer ex-
amination of the case law interpreting this statute, however,
reveals that the courts have occasionally accorded some weight
to a testator's intent in determining whether a will was signed at
the end and also have attempted to mitigate some of the fore-
seeable hardships which would result from a strict application of
the requirement.
At the beginning of this century the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, in Morrow's Estate (No. 1),61 stated that common under-
standing and practice must guide the determination of the order
of writing and the location of the end of a will, and that the ap-
plication of technical rules to instruments written without pro-
fessional aid would produce unendurable hardships.62 In Swire's
Estate,63 another decision from that period, the court asserted
that although the bottom of the page is the natural and presum-
ably correct place for a testator's signature to show that his
wishes are fully expressed, this may be rebutted by evidence of a
different intent. 4 Two years later, in Stinson's Estate," the court
testamonium clause meant to identify the testator but did not sign at the end of
the clause. 413 Pa. at 93, 196 A.2d 298. The court declared that the question
about whether the writing was signed at the end was not one of the decedent's
intention but what he actually did or failed to do. Id. at 97, 196 A.2d at 300.
60. See supra notes 29 & 30 and accompanying text.
61. 204 Pa. 479, 54 A. 313 (1903). The will in question in Morrow was writ-
ten on a single sheet of foolscap with the dispositive provisions in consecutive
paragraphs on the first side and the attestation clause and signatures of the
testatrix and two witnesses on the reverse side. Id. at 479-81, 54 A. at 313-14.
Rejecting a challenge that the will was not signed at the end because there
were two blank lines at the bottom of the first side, the court asserted that
while leaving the blank was imprudent in that it afforded an opportunity for
fraudulent practice, it would certainly not of itself invalidate the will. Id. at 481,
54 A. at 314.
62. Id.
63. 225 Pa. 188, 73 A. 1110 (1909). In Swire, a one page codicil to a will
contained eight dispositive provisions, followed by the testatrix' signature. In
the left margin, perpendicular to the rest of the writing, were four additional
dispositive provisions. Id. at 189, 73 A. at 1110. After noting the irregular ar-
rangement of the parts of the writing, the court nonetheless concluded that the
full sustance of the testatrix's intent and its expression were present and that
her signature was at what she intended and regarded as the end of her will.
The court stated that where that is manifest, the continuity of sense and not
the mere position of the page must determine the statutory end of the will. Id.
at 192, 73 A. at 1111.
64. Id. at 191, 73 A. at 1110.
65. 228 Pa. 475, 77 A. 807 (1910). The holographic document in contention
in Stinson was a single sheet of legal foolscap folded in the middle to make a
[Vol. 20:365
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held that the end of a will under the statute is not the physical
or spatial end, but rather what the testator regarded as the end
of his will and what is manifest from an inspection of the
writing.6
Some commentators have discerned .a return to this more lib-
eral approach in recent decisions." In a 1953 case, Kehr Will,"8
the court sympathetically placed itself in the testatrix' "arm-
chair" and considered the circumstances under which the writing
was made and the decedent's' probable intent. 9 More recently,
Justice Roberts, writing for the majority in Miller Will,"0 as-
folio of four pages. The testatrix wrote only on the first, second, and third
pages and her signature appeared in the middle of page two. Id. at 476, 77 A. at
808. The court determined that the will on its face bore the unmistakable se-
quence which the testatrix intended to give it, from the first to the third and
then back to the second page. It found that there was a connected internal
sense containing a clear expression of testamentary intention and concluded
from an inspection of the writing that she signed her name at the place which
she regarded as the end of her will. Id. at 478, 77 A. at 808.
66. Id. at 478, 77 A. at 808.
67. See Brookstover, Estates and Trusts, 26 U. PITT. L. REV. 313 (1964); 6
DUQ. L. REV. 322 (1967); 10 VILL. L. REV. 196 (1964).
68. 373 Pa. 473, 95 A.2d 647 (1953). The Kehr court found that the testatrix
had effectively revoked a prior will by writing the words "Null and Void," and
under them her initials, at the top of the first page of an unexecuted carbon
copy of the original will. Id. at 480, 95 A.2d at 650. Most of the effort expended
after the court had placed itself in the testatrix's armchair was directed to the
questions of whether it was her intention to revoke the will and whether the in-
itials were a sufficient signature. The court had no doubt that the revoking in-
strument was signed at the end thereof, despite the unusual arrangement. Id.
at 479, 95 A.2d at 650.
69. Id. at 475, 95 A.2d at 648. As part of the determination of these cir-
cumstances the court upheld the admission of oral testimony concerning the
decedent's acts and declarations. The Kehr court asserted that "whenever an
instrument is ambiguous or the intention to will or to revoke is uncertain, acts,
declarations and relevant circumstances are admissible to clarify or explain the
ambiguity or to prove testator's intention." Id. at 476, 95 A.2d at 649.
70. 414 Pa. 385, 200 A.2d 284 (1964). The decedent in Miller failed to use
the signature line of a commercial will form but instead entered her name in
the attestation clause. Id. at 387, 200 A.2d at 284-85. Although the Miller court
distinguished the questions of whether the will was.signed and whether it was
signed at the end, it discussed them out of logical order. Id. at 388-90, 200 A.2d
at 285-86. It first concluded that the will was signed at the end, on the basis of
an examination of the entire instrument, and only then determined that the will
was signed. This latter determination turned upon the decedent's insertion of
the pronoun "my" before the word "Last Will and Testament" in the printed at-
testation clause, which signaled to the court a present testamentary intent. Id.
at 390, 200 A.2d at 286. Churchill's Estate, 260 Pa. 94, 103 A. 533 (1918), supra
notes 29 & 58, was distinguishable because the decedent there used the pro-
noun "his" in the attestation clause, which indicated to the court that the name
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serted that the end of the instrument is not the particular point
chosen by the printer of the form, but the place selected by the
testator as the logical and sequential end of his dispositive act.71
Two years later, in Van Gilder Will,"2 the court held that once it
was concluded that several disputed sheets were not spurious,
the only remaining purpose for enforcing the requirement that a
will be signed at the end was the exclusion from probate of those
documents which leave uncertainty about whether the decedent's
testamentary disposition was complete.73 Finally, in In re Estate
of Stasis4 the court unanimously rejected the position that
neither the manner in which a will was signed nor the intention
of the decedent in signing it was material to the determination of
whether the location of the signature conformed to the provi-
sions of the statute.75 According to the court, neither the statute
itself nor prior decisions interpreting it required such a narrow
inserted in the same clause was only an indentification of the purported
testator, and not a signature, 41 Pa. at 389, 200 A.2d at 281.
71. 414 Pa. at 390, 200 A.2d at 286.
72. 421 Pa. 520, 220 A.2d 21 (1966). The purported will in Van Gilder con-
sisted of five unattached holographic sheets, two of which were signed. Id. at
523, 220 A.2d at 23. The court accepted the lower court's determination that
there was no suggestion of fraud and upheld its conclusion that all five sheets
were part of a harmonious scheme of testamentary disposition, despite the fact
that none of the sheets contained an explicit reference to any other, and none
was united to another by the continuation of a sentence of paragraph. Id. at
525-26, 220 A.2d at 24. The court thus appeared to be limiting the role of the
location of the signature in preventing fraud. See supra note 51 and accompany-
ing text.
73. 421 Pa. at 528, 220 A.2d at 26.
74. 452 Pa. 425, 307 A.2d 241 (1973). The Stasis court upheld the holographic
will written on both sides of a single sheet of paper and signed upside down in
the margin at the top of the reverse side of the sheet. Id. at 428, 307 A.2d at
243. After defining "end" as the sequential and logical end of the language used
by the decedent to express his testamentary purpose, Chief Justice Jones con-
tended that it was sometimes necessary to closely examine a document to
determine where its end was to avoid extreme injustice. Id. at 430, 307 A.2d at
245.
75. Id. at 428, 307 A.2d at 243. The court apparently rejected the established
view that the determination of whether a will is signed at the end is a question of
law. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. It is not clear, however, what
kinds of evidence would be admissible in determining the manner of signing and
the intention of the decedent to sign at the end of the will. For instance, would
limited parol evidence be admissible in determining that the decedent affixed his
signature at what he intended as the end of his will? Cf. Bradley v. Bradley, 371
So. 2d 168 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (trial court should take testimony to deter-
mine the intention surrounding the execution of the instrument).
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position."6 Acknowledging that it had been adamant that nothing
following a signature may be admitted to probate, the court
noted that in certain limited circumstances, in order to avoid ex-
treme injustice, it has closely examined a document to determine
where its "end" was." The Stasis court was apparently in-
dicating that when it was convinced that a document was com-
pleted with testamentary intent but the signature was not at the
place which would normally be regarded as the end, it could at-
tempt to find some plausible sequence of, actions which would
have led the decedent to the place of his signature as the logical
or sequential end of his will."8
In re Estate of Proley presented the first opportunity for the
court to clarify it9 holding in Stasis with regard to the role of a
decedent's intent and the manner of his signing in determining
whether a will was signed at the end. The proponent of the Pro-
ley will argued that Stasis should control and urged a broad in-
terpretation of the court's holding there.79 However, Justice Fla-
herty's opinion referred only to the Stasis court's affirmance of
the position that the end of a will is its logical or sequential
end. 0 He did not explicitly consider the Stasis holding on a dece-
76. 452 Pa. at 429, 307 A.2d at 243. The court quoted extensively from the
earlier opinions of Morrow's Estate (No. 1), 204 Pa. 479, 54 A. 313 (1903), and
Swire's Estate, 225 Pa. 188, 73 A. 1110 (1909). See supra notes 61 & 63.
77. 452 Pa. at 430, 307 A.2d at 244.
78. Id. at 432, 307 A.2d at 245. The court found that there was no question
that the Stasis instrument, which the Register of Wills had refused to probate,
was intended by the decedent to be her will. Id. at 427, 307 A.2d at 243. To
avoid what it perceived as extreme injustice, the court proceeded to examine
the document closely. It was determined that when the testatrix reached the
bottom of the second side of the sheet, she had no room left to sign and rather
than use another sheet, she simply rotated the page 180 degrees and signed in
the only remaining space, the upper margin. Id. at 432, 307 A.2d at 245. Despite
the unusual location, the court concluded that the signature fulfilled all its func-
tions-it provided authentication for the instrument, identified the testatrix,
and provided certainty as to completed testamentary purposes. Id.
79. Brief for Appellant at 10, 21-24. The proponent of the Proley will con-
tended that where there is a clear showing of testamentary intent and no sug-
gestion of fraud, a will should be admitted to probate if the decedent has
substantially complied with the statutory formalities, even if the will is signed
in the wrong place. Id. at 24. See supra note 13 and infra text accompanying
notes 89-104. The proponent further suggested that the court should expressly
overrule the prior cases which are incompatible with the holding in Stasis. Brief
for Appellant at 24.
80. 492 Pa. at 67, 422 A.2d at 141.
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dent's intent and manner of signing, and did not mention the
older line of cases which accorded some weight to intention."
Justice Flaherty did, however, attempt to follow the approach of
the Stasis court: having determined that the decedent intended
the writing to be her will and that extreme injustice would re-
sult from a strict application of the statutory requirement, he
engaged in a close scrutiny of the document in an attempt to find
a logical or sequential connection between the place where she
signed and the rest of the writing.2
While Justice Roberts and Chief Justice O'Brien were able to
accept such an analysis in Stasis, neither one did so here. In-
stead, Justice Roberts did not cite Stasis, and he reverted to the
narrow formalism which the court seemed to have been abandon-
ing.83 It is difficult to reconcile his opinion in Proley with his ac-
ceptance of the court's approach in Stasis and with his opinion in
Miller Will." It is also difficult to reconcile with his dissent in
Knupp Will,85 where he rejected as unjustified the majority's
fear that anything other than a strict construction of testamen-
tary formalities would open the door to fraud. In his Knupp dis-
81. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 61-66.
82. 492 Pa. at 66-67, 422 A.2d at 140-41. Therefore much of Justice Fla-
herty's opinion was devoted to the analysis of the minute physical detail of the
Proley will. See supra text accompanying notes 34-41.
83. 492 Pa. at 62-63, 422 A.2d at 138-39. See supra text accompanying notes
28-30. Justice Roberts contended that the lower court's rejection of the Proley
will was based on a correct and consistent reading of all the cases in which the
Supreme Court has interpreted this legislative mandate but he overlooked the
more liberal line of earlier cases. Id. at 60, 422 A.2d at 137. See supra text ac-
companying notes 61-74.
84. See supra notes 70 & 71 and accompanying text.
85. 428 Pa. 409, 235 A.2d 585 (1967). In Knupp the decedent's name ap-
peared only in the recital and in the attestation clauses of a holographic
writing. Relying on Churchill's Estate, 260 P. 94, 103 A. 533 (1918), see supra
notes 29 & 58, and Glace Will, 413 Pa. 91, 196 A.2d 297 (1964), see supra notes
29 & 58, the court held that it was clear as crystal that the decedent did not
sign the paper at the end. Nonetheless, the actual holding again appeared to be
that the decedent's name was not a signature but only an identification, making
superfluous the question of whether the signature was at the end. 428 Pa. at
413-14; 235 A.2d at 586-87. The court distinguished Miller Will, see supra note
70, where it upheld a will signed in the attestation clause, because the testatrix
used the pronoun "my" before the words "Last Will and Testament," whereas
in Knupp the decedent used the third person pronoun, "her," as was the case in
Churchill and Glace. 428 Pa. at 419, 235 A.2d at 589.
86. 428 Pa. at 422-23, 235 A.2d at 591 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice
Roberts realistically noted that certain kinds of fraud, such as the altering of a
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sent he suggested that a more liberal rule of construction was
sometimes possible if applied cautiously and with an awareness
of its effect on future cases involving similar factual situations. 7
Because the court was evenly divided in its Proley opinion, the
decision will have limited precedential value.8 However, because
Justice Roberts' opinion reaffirmed the doctrine of strict com-
pliance, and because neither opinion cited the court's decisions
evidencing a more liberal trend or distinguished the apparently
incompatible holding in Stasis, the interpretation of this testa-
mentary formality in Pennsylvania has become more confused. It
would be difficult to predict the outcome and rationale of the
court's next decision involving facts similar to Proley. The many
wills prepared and executed by lawyers will not be affected by
this uncertainty because such wills are almost always carefully
drafted to comply with the letter of any statutory requirements.
However, home-drawn wills executed by lay persons who are
often ignorant of the existence or importance of testamentary for-
malities are likely to continue to be invalidated because of formal
defects.
document's testamentary provisions by some third person, cannot be prevented
no matter how the document is signed, and that the choice of pronouns in the
attestation clause could have no effect whatsoever on this risk. Id. at 423, 235
A.2d at 591-92 (Roberts, J., dissenting). He would overrule Churchill as well as
Glace Will to the extent that they require the use of the word "my" in the at-
testation clause before a signature appearing there in can be said to have the
requisite testamentary intent to validate a will. Id. at 421, 235 A.2d at 590
(Roberts, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 423, 235 A.2d at 591 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Roberts pro-
posed the rule that all the evidence be examined in each case to determine if
the testator signed the attestation clause with the requisite testamentary in-
tent. Id. at 421, 235 A.2d at 590 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
In the Knupp case he considered the fact that the will was entirely in the dece-
dent's handwriting, the testimony of the subscribing witnesses that the dece-
dent told them it was her will, and the testimony that the decedent entered her
name after one of the witnesses had signed, and concluded that the signature
was intended as a separate testamentary signing. Id. at 422, 235 A.2d at 591
(Roberts, J., dissenting). He emphasized that there were no blank spaces in the
body of the will and that the signature in the attestation clause symbolically as
well as physically prevented the addition of other provisions prior to the
signature. Id. at 423, 235 A.2d at 591 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Furthermore, a
similar signature in any subsequent similar will would provide identical
assurance there. Id.
88. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 216 (1942) (an affirmance by an
evenly divided court, while conclusive and binding on the parties, is not an
authoritative precedent for other cases because of the lack of agreement by a
majority of the court on the principles of law involved).
19821
Duquesne Law Review
Although the Uniform Probate Code does not specify a location
for the testator's signature,89 the Pennsylvania legislature chose
to retain the requirement when it recently revised the Wills
Act.9 0 Nonetheless, Pennsylvania's statute remains one of the
most liberal in the United States, facilitating testation by mini-
mizing formalities even beyond the provisions of the Uniform
Probate Code.9 Only for failure to comply with the formal re-
quirement regarding the location of the signature is a Pennsyl-
vania will likely to be rejected with harsh indifference to the tes-
tator's intention. Although Justice Roberts in Proley reasserted
the position that strict enforcement of this requirement is a mat-
ter of legislative mandate," the cases he cited do not conclusively
establish that contention. Furthermore, the court itself has not
89. See supra note 47. The comments prefacing the Wills section of the
Uniform Probate Code contend that if the will is to regain its role as the major
instrument for the disposition of wealth at death, its execution must be kept
simple. Accordingly, testamentary formalities in the code are minimal and the
basic intent is to validate a will whenever possible. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §
2-502, 8 U.L.A. 348-49 comment (1972). The code requires that a will be signed
but no location is specified; the comments indicate that the statute would be
satisfied if the testator wrote his name in the body of the will intending it to be
his signature. Id. It appears that a signature on the back of a will made with
testamentary intent would also satisfy the statute. Id.
90. Act of July 1, 1972, 1972 Pa. Laws 508 (codified at 20 PA. CONS. STAT §
2502 (Purdon 1980)). The editorial comments do not explain the legislature's
decision to retain the requirement.
91. Both the Pennsylvania statute and the Uniform Probate Code permit
holographic wills and neither requires that a testator publish his will or sign it
in the presence of witnesses. However, the Pennsylvania statute goes even fur-
ther and eliminates entirely the requirement that a will be witnessed when it is
made. Instead, the signature of the testator need only be proved by the oaths
or affirmations of two competent witnesses when the will is offered for probate.
20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3132 (Purdon 1980). Even the harshness of the require-
ment that a will be signed at the end thereof has been mitigated since the revi-
sion of the Wills Act in 1917, with the addition of the provision that any writing
after the signature to a will shall not invalidate that which precedes the
signature. Id. § 2502(1) (1980). See Note, The Unique Informality of Penn-
sylvania Requirements Attendant to the Execution of Wills, 33 TEMP. L.Q. 346
(1960).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
93. 492 Pa. at 63, 422 A.2d at 138-39. Justice Roberts cited Churchill's
Estate, 260 Pa. at 101, 103 A. at 535, supra notes 29 & 58, and Coyne Will; 349
Pa. at 334, 37 A.2d at 510-11, supra note 30. Neither opinion examined the
legislative history of the statute to find support for the contention that the
legislature had mandated that the provision be strictly enforced.The Churchill
court did quote extensively from Smee v. Bryer, 6 Moore P.C. 404 (1848), which
asserted that it was the legislature, having regard for all possible cir-
[Vol. 20:365
Recent Decisions
consistently applied the standard and has occasionally attempted
to accomodate a testator's intention.94 The court's retention of a
rigid interpretation of this provision is incompatible with the
otherwise liberal approach to testation in Pennsylvania.
The Stasis court attempted to articulate an approach to the re-
quirement which would facilitate the validation of a will when
the court was convinced that the testator signed with testamen-
tary intent." However, under this approach the court is forced to
engage in a painstaking and occasionally implausible interpreta-
tion of the physical details of each such document. Whether a
will is upheld may turn on the court's ability to distinguish ap-
parently trivial details, such as whether a printed will form con-
tained a line and a seal to indicate where the testator should
sign, or only a line.96
A more reasonable approach, which would preserve the protec-
tive function of the requirement while granting the court more
flexibility and encouraging just results, would be the adoption of
the doctrine of substantial compliance.97 Under this approach, a
formal defect in a will would raise only a rebuttable, not a con-
clusive presumption of invalidity.98 Proponents of the will would
cumstances, which had determined that it was preferable to risk the occasional
frustration of testamentary intent rather than to risk giving effect to or
facilitating the formation of spurious wills by the absence of form. However,
,Smee is an English opinion and the legislature to which it referred was the
British Parliament, not the Pennsylvania Legislature.
The Pennsylvania legislature has identified certain categories of statutes
whose provisions are to be strictly construed. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1928 (Purdon
1980).. The Wills Act is not included. One commentator has argued that the rule
of strict compliance with wills act formalities is entirely a judical creation. See
Langebein, Crumbling of the Wills Act: Australians Point the Way, 65 A.B.A.
J. 1192, 1195 (1979) (strict compliance rule is a judicial creation which courts or
legislature can abandon).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 61-78.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 74-78.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 21-26 and notes 39-41. Cf. Knupp
Will, 428 Pa. at 419, 235 A.2d at 589 (distinguished will in that case from similar
wills signed in the attestation clause on the basis of the decedent's choice of
pronouns).
97. The proponent of the Proley will advocated the doctrine of substantial
compliance, see supra note 81, and the lower court discussed the doctrine
favorably. See supra note 13. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dido
not address it.
98. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 489, 513 (1975) (analyzes the purposes underlying the formalities of wills
acts and argues that substantial compliance should replace the prevailing stan-
dard of strict interpretation).
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be allowed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defect was harmless and that the testator's conduct served the
purpose of the formality.99 Only if the court were convinced that
the protective functions of the provision were preserved would
substantial compliance be sufficient. Some formalities, such as
the requirements that a will be in writing and be signed, would
virtually always demand strict compliance.'00 However, the speci-
fication of the location of the signature would be susceptible to
the more liberal mode of interpretation. Such an approach would
bring the interpretation of wills into line with the standard of
substantial compliance which applies to popular wills substitutes
such as cash value life insurance and tentative trusts.1°1
If the doctrine of substantial compliance were adopted, the
court would only have to extend the kind of analysis in which it
engages When it determines whether a document is testamentary
in nature or whether a signature was made with testamentary
intent.0 2 This would further weaken the distinction between
questions of fact and questions of law.' However, the court has
occasionally moderated its approach to formalities which are
"questions of law" when it was convinced that no fraud was in-
volved and when the equities of a case demanded it."4 The ap-
plication of the substantial compliance doctrine to the location of
the testator's signature would make the interpretation of testa-
mentary formalities more predictable and consistent. This would
improve the otherwise exemplary approach -to testation in Penn-
sylvania and the testamentary intentions of decedents like
Susanna Proley could be justly effectuated.
John J. Burns
99. Langbein, supra note 93, at 1194-95 (reports that in 1975 the South
Australian Parliament enacted a substantial compliance doctrine for testamen-
tary formalities and that only a single case of litigation arose in the first three
years).
100. Langebein, supra note 98, at 518-19.
101. Id. at 505-09.
102. See, e.g., supra notes 68 & 69.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 54-58. The Stasis court was ap-
'parently ready to abandon the distinction. See supra note 75.
104. See, e.g., Van Gilder Will, 421 Pa. 520, 220 A.2d 21 (1966). See also
supra text accompanying notes 64-81. Even the opponent of the Proley will
acknowledged that the supreme court had adopted a substantial compliance rule
in defining "end" to mean "sequential end." Brief for Appellees at 8.
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